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The issue yield model introduced a theory of the herestethic use of policy issues as strategic 
resources in multidimensional party competition. We extend the model by systematically 
addressing the specificities of issue yield dynamics in multi-party systems, with special regard 
to parties' issue yield rankings (relative position) and issue yield heterogeneity (differentiation) 
on each issue. Secondly, we introduce a novel research design for original data collection that 
allows for a more systematic testing of the model, by featuring: a) a large number of policy 
issues; b) the use of Twitter content for coding parties’ issue emphasis; c) an appropriate time 
sequence for measuring issue yield configurations and issue emphasis. We finally present 
findings from a pilot implementation of such design, performed at the occasion of the 2014 
European Parliament election in Italy. Findings confirm the soundness of the design and provide 
support for the newly introduced hypotheses about multi-party competition.  
 
Introduction 
According to a growing body of literature, the dynamics and strategies of party competition 
have seen a gradual but steady change in recent decades. A number of studies have shown the 
increasing importance of the political issues of the day for voting behaviour, on both sides of 
the Atlantic (Page & Brody, 1972; Pomper, 1972; Miller, Miller, Raine, & Brown, 1976; Nie, 
Verba, & Petrocik, 1976; Carmines & Stimson, 1980; Franklin, 1985; Franklin, Mackie, & 
Valen, 1992; Alvarez & Nagler, 1995, 1998; Borre, 2001; Heath, Jowell, & Curtice, 2001; 
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Aardal & van Wijnen, 2005). At the same time, recent studies have clearly documented how 
parties have reacted to such changes, with their platforms dedicating more space to a wider 
variety of issues unrelated to traditional dimensions of party competition (Green-Pedersen, 
2007). These dynamics appear relevant, as recent elections have shown increasing success of 
new, non-mainstream parties often focusing on a narrow range of issues (Hobolt & De Vries, 
2015).  
What has been missing so far, however, is a general, comprehensive theoretical model of the 
issue selection process, i.e. of what issues should be emphasized by a party in a campaign. 
Previous studies have shown that parties are in part responsive to a general party system agenda 
(McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Nannestad & Paldam, 1997; Steenbergen & Scott, 2004; Wagner, 
2012), and in part focusing on issues they are known to own (Petrocik, 1996). However, no 
perspective to our knowledge has systematically and empirically investigated the underlying 
(and perhaps causally antecedent) process through which parties strategically select issues to 
be emphasized, e.g. according to herestethics concerns such as those theorized by William 
Riker (1986). 
Recently, a solution to fill this gap has been introduced through the issue yield model (De 
Sio & Weber, 2014). This model posits that parties select campaign issues based on two 
strategic considerations: a) whether a policy position on the issue is positively associated with 
the party (in both substantive and statistical sense); b) whether such position is also widely 
shared in the general electorate. If both conditions are met, that issue will allow the party to 
reach out to a larger voter base. The model then develops an empirical strategy, by computing 
– from simple survey questions – an issue yield index expressing the electoral potential offered 
by each issue to each party. The main testable implication of the model is that parties will give 
more emphasis to those issues that present a higher yield. 
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The model has been mostly tested so far on comparative data on EU party systems, by relying 
on Manifesto data for issue emphasis and European Election Studies data for public opinion 
(De Sio & Weber, 2014; De Sio, Franklin, & Weber, 2016). Thus, all such applications are 
secondary analyses, relying on data collection processes that were not designed with such 
theory in mind. This choice is not optimal, in terms of: a) the usually small number of issues 
covered; b) the adequacy of Manifesto data for testing the model’s hypotheses; c) the 
appropriateness of the time sequence in the collection of data for constructing the independent 
and dependent variables. Moreover, the above applications have considered the specific 
dynamics of multi-party competition only to a limited extent. 
In this paper we present – and apply empirically – a theoretical development of issue yield 
theory towards multi-party competition, along with a novel research design aimed at addressing 
the aforementioned concerns, thus allowing more rigorous empirical testing. Such design is 
based on the following components: (a) a pre-electoral selection of a large number of potentially 
relevant issues; (b) a voter survey, whose questionnaire includes items for all the 
aforementioned issues, aimed at capturing issue yield configurations for each party before the 
campaign; (c) the collection and coding of Twitter content for each party during the campaign 
(according to a coding scheme covering exactly the same issues identified in step (a)), in order 
to properly capture the strategic campaign choices by political parties. As a pilot study, we 
fielded such design at the occasion of the campaign for the European Parliament elections of 
2014 in Italy. 
The paper is structured as follows. After this introductory section, the second section 
recapitulates the issue yield model and presents a new theoretical development dedicated to 
multi-party competition, while the third section discusses specific aspects concerning the use 
of Twitter data. A fourth section presents the empirical strategy and the methodological choices 
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employed in the paper. The fifth section is finally dedicated to the presentation of empirical 
findings, followed by a concluding section. 
Party strategy and issue yield: a perspective for multi-party 
systems 
The dynamics that govern the selection by political parties of those issues that make up their 
agendas and campaigns lie at the core of the process of representation, and they present a direct 
relationship to party competition. This is already visible in early models of party competition 
(Downs 1957) where the fundamental interaction between parties and voters that governs 
electoral competition takes place through a shared language (cf. Fuchs & Klingemann, 1989) 
structured around policy issues. It is on such issues that voters assess party platforms, and it is 
on such issues that parties adapt themselves to fit voters’ preference distributions. According 
to Downs, such issue language is simplified in terms of a single dimension of conflict, which – 
under additional assumptions – allows the emergence of a Nash equilibrium, implicitly pushing 
parties towards the position of the median voter under certain political circumstances. The 
strategic virtue of such median position is that it effectively accommodates two goals of parties: 
expanding their voter base, while retaining as possible their extant support. 
However, such conception has been also challenged, with the notable example of the valence 
politics framework (Stokes 1963) where the same goal – expanding the electoral base while not 
jeopardizing extant support – is reached through very different means. Instead of focusing on 
divisive issues (issues where a distribution of voter preferences exists, and where parties employ 
a positional strategy), a party can selectively focus on few widely shared, non-divisive goals 
(historical examples are related to national security, corruption and economic prosperity), 
where it can claim superior competence and credibility. 
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The two models differ in a variety of aspects. However, from our point of view there is one 
aspect (overlooked by most literature) that is mostly distinctive between the two approaches, 
and which highlights the importance of political agendas. It is clear in Stokes’ contribution that 
the issue agenda is not considered fixed, and is instead considered as a strategic resource, which 
parties have an interest in dynamically manipulating to their convenience.1 
Such intuition was not followed by a systematic theoretical development before the 
introduction of the idea of herestethics by Riker (1986). According to Riker’s intuition, parties 
in an unfavourable position on the main dimension of conflict (often, the left-right dimension) 
will concentrate their emphasis and attempt to turn the campaign debate on other issues where 
they enjoy a more favourable position. 
The introduction of this approach raises then a key question: what are such “most favourable 
issues” for each party? Can a general model be proposed, capturing the incentives and 
disincentives that each issue offers to each party?2 This question has received uneven attention 
from the literature, so that we might say that no theoretical framework (with a convincing 
empirical operationalization) has so far filled this gap. Obvious seminal contributions in this 
direction can be identified in saliency theory (Budge & Farlie, 1983) and issue ownership 
(Petrocik, 1996). However, the former saw the selective issue emphasis adopted by political 
parties mostly as a communication tool for presenting the relatively static ideological stances 
of the party (Budge, 2015); and the latter, too, assumed relatively static, long-standing 
reputations of competence on specific issues. As a result, both approaches are not compatible 
with the aforementioned dynamic, strategic view of party agendas; a view which appears more 
and more appropriate, especially with the increasing volatility and tensions characterizing 
multi-party systems in Western Europe (Chiaramonte & Emanuele, 2015; Hernández & Kriesi, 
2016).3 Recently, a more dynamic view of the strategic use of issue emphasis has been 
introduced with the notion of issue entrepreneurship (Hobolt & De Vries, 2015); however, this 
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concept is circumscribed by its proponents4 to what other authors have identified as niche 
parties (Meguid, 2008), and cannot be easily generalized to all (including mainstream) parties 
(Hobolt & De Vries, 2015, pp. 1162–1165). 
Following a somehow different path (relying on a dynamic, survey-based measurement of 
different distributions of preferences), the issue yield model has proposed a generalized model 
explicitly aimed at positional issues, which directly confronts the question of assessing the risk-
opportunity configuration offered by each issue to each party, without being limited to new 
issues or specific types of parties. Let us see this contribution in more detail. 
Issue yield 
The recently introduced issue yield model (De Sio and Weber 2014) has been presented as a 
model of strategic issue selection  by political parties. The model addresses this question in two 
steps: 1) it theoretically identifies two criteria that parties can use to assess the electoral risks 
and opportunities associated with each issue; 2) it develops a synthetic index based on a 
combination of such criteria.5 In a nutshell, optimal issues are those where a policy position6 is: 
a) associated with the party (both in statistical and substantive sense), so as to provide a 
beneficial competitive linkage for the party and minimize the risk of internal divisions; b) 
widely supported in the general electorate (well beyond the current level of party support), so 
as to offer a potential for electoral expansion (De Sio, 2010; De Sio & Weber, 2014). Finally, 
the model defines as bridge issues those issues that combine both characteristics (as they in fact 
represent a “bridge” allowing the party to reach out to a new, larger voter base) and predicts 
that such issues will receive the highest emphasis in party campaigns. 
To help grasping the key mechanisms of the model, we present in Table 1 a summarization 
of the electoral opportunities and risks presented by different issues to the four major Italian 
parties, according to an original CAWI survey we administered in Spring 2014, during the 
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European parliament election campaign (see below). For each policy statement, we report: a) 
the percentage of agreement among all respondents; b) the percentage of agreement among 
voters of each of the parties;7 c) values of the issue yield index offered by each issue (separately 
for the pro and anti side) to each party.8 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
As clear from the table, values of the issue yield index offer a summarization of a positive 
combination of high support in general and even higher support within the party (implying a 
positive party-issue association). This can be effectively exemplified by contrasting the issue 
yield configurations for the centre-left, mainstream Democratic Party (PD) and for the right-
wing, populist Northern League (Ln). Issues with the highest yield for the PD are (ranked by 
decreasing yield): 1) support for sustainable development (0.89); 2) support for a budget 
reduction for F-35 fighter-bombers (0.88); 3) support for reduction of income inequality (0.85) 
and 4) for EU integration (0.85); 5) hostility towards allowing macro-regions to secede from 
Italy (0.84 for the anti position, in the penultimate row of the table). As an example, the high 
value of the index for sustainable development (0.89) reflects the high support in the general 
electorate (87 %) and an even higher support within the party (93 %). As a result, such issue 
does not present risks of internal division, and offers large opportunities for potential electoral 
expansion. 
Similar considerations apply for the Northern League. Its configuration shows, as top issues: 
1) support for a tougher attitude against India in the Enrica Lexie case (0.98); 2) support for 
more restrictive laws against immigration (0.95); 3) support for privileging Italians in welfare 
access (0.93); 4) support for the legalization of prostitution (0.82) and 5) for a budget reduction 
for F-35 fighter-bombers (0.82). In the case of the Enrica Lexie issue, the value of 0.98 reflects 
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the high support in the general electorate (80 %) and the almost unanimous support within the 
party (98 %). In general, it is clear that lower-yield issues, for each party, are associated with 
lower levels of general support and higher risks of internal divisions. 
As a result, we argue that the issue yield model offers an effective way to assess the 
combination of risks and opportunities that each issue offers to each party. As such, it offers a 
model of strategic issue selection that is not constrained to specific (types of) parties. However, 
further elaboration is needed, in terms of the complex issue yield dynamics of multi-party 
systems. This is the task we now confront in our original elaboration. 
 
Issue yield dynamics in multi-party systems 
The patterns shown in Table 1 already suggest how multi-party competition presents issue 
competition dynamics that differ from a two-party context. In a two-party system, an issue with 
a high yield for a party will likely present a much lower yield for its rival: as a result, the two 
will mostly emphasize different issues. In a multiparty system the situation is more complex: 
in particular, it is likely that e.g. two parties will have a high yield on the same issue. In 
principle, we would expect both parties to emphasize it; in practice, however, both parties will 
carefully assess whether to use the issue or not, to avoid the risk that bringing the issue to the 
attention of voters might, in the end, favour the other party. 
This problem cannot be directly addressed by the issue yield index alone, as it only takes 
into account one party at a time. In order to account for multiparty dynamics, we suggest to 
introduce two additional aspects that concern respectively: a) the relative position of a party – 
in terms of yield on a specific issue – vis-à-vis other parties; b) the extent of issue yield 
differentiation among parties within the same issue. 
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Regarding the first aspect, we argue that having a relatively high yield on an issue might still 
not be enough for a party to be motivated in strategically emphasizing that issue. A party also 
has to take into account its relative position vis-à-vis other parties. Having a relatively high 
yield might still be compatible with the presence of another party with an even higher yield. In 
this scenario the issue yield mechanism might be dampened, as the party would avoid 
emphasizing the issue, given that such emphasis might result in an electoral benefit for another 
party. As a result, we argue that – for a party – the issue yield mechanism will act in full force 
only for such issues where the party enjoys a favourable relative position (i.e. with the highest 
ranking yield on that issue). Therefore, the higher the relative position of a party on an issue, 
the higher the impact of issue yield.  
As for the second aspect, it should be clear enough by comparing – in Table 1 – issue yield 
values for the ius soli issue (granting Italian citizenship to all babies born on Italian soil). The 
issue yield configuration appears clearly differentiated on this issue, ranging from a low 0.34 
for Ln to a very high 0.82 for the PD, and with clearly separated intermediate values of 0.54 for 
Fi and 0.67 for M5S. In such a scenario, we would expect issue emphasis to reflect closely issue 
yield, with the PD likely emphasizing the issue and other parties presenting lower levels of 
emphasis. On the contrary, consider an issue such as heterologous insemination. Here values of 
yield for all parties are in a much narrower range (between 0.57 and 0.70): as a result, there is 
a high risk that – if one party attempts to move the public debate towards this issue – this effort 
might either raise an inconclusive discussion among different parties – none of which enjoys 
some particularly beneficial position (not even the one raising the issue) – or become 
counterproductive by increasing the perceived importance of an issue on which other parties 
could potentially intercept the support with more convincing arguments during the campaign 
(given that the baseline levels are close). In this case, we expect parties to avoid wasting 
campaign energies on such unproductive or potentially damaging issues, leading to a lower 
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importance of the logic of issue yield. Conversely, and in general terms, the higher the issue 
yield differentiation among parties on a given issue, the higher the impact of issue yield. 
Hypotheses 
We finally express the aforementioned considerations in terms of empirical hypotheses. We 
anticipate here that (as discussed in the next section) the case study concerns the campaign for 
the European Parliament 2014 election in Italy, and that the parties’ strategic issue emphasis 
will be measured through a coding of Twitter content. In light of these choices, our research 
questions translate into the following hypotheses: 
H1: issue yield (measured pre-campaign) predicts Twitter emphasis in the campaign; 
H2: issue yield presents a positive interaction with the party’s relative position (in terms of 
issue yield) on a given issue; 
H3: issue yield presents a positive interaction with issue yield differentiation on a given issue. 
Capturing party strategy: a novel research design 
As anticipated in the Introduction, several contributions have empirically tested the theoretical 
predictions of the issue yield model. All of them have employed secondary analysis, thus 
relying on existing datasets whose data collection process was not designed with issue yield 
theory in mind. Thus, we argue that a newly conceived research design aimed at testing issue 
yield theory might improve the data collection process in the following directions: 
a) Scope and number of issues. So far, applications of the issue yield model have been 
relying, for calculating issue yield configurations, on the European Election Study Voter 
Component of 2009 and 2014 (De Sio & Weber, 2014; De Sio, Franklin, & Weber, 2016). Such 
surveys only included a relatively small number of policy issue statements (12 for the EES 
2009, 8 for the EES 2014), mostly aimed at capturing general orientations on broader value 
dimensions (economic, cultural, EU integration) than current, salient, country-specific 
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campaign issues. As a result, an original research design should aim at including a larger 
number of policy issues, ideally covering most of the questions that are salient in the political 
debate in a given country (as they would become the strategic resources employed by parties 
during the campaign). 
b) Operationalization of the dependent variable. The aforementioned applications have 
operationalized party emphasis on different issues through Manifesto data. This poses at least 
two concerns. First, in general party manifestos are actually recognised to not fully represent 
the strategic communication employed by parties for electoral purposes. Not only manifestos 
inevitably reflect the compromises related to intra-party conflicts (and the need to accommodate 
the requests of party ideologists), but – most importantly – they inherently run in a logic that is 
much different compared to the issue yield model. While the model posits that parties will focus 
on a relatively small number of strategic issues, party manifestos aim at covering many issues 
across different policy domains, in order to supply members and militants with the official 
position of the party. This logic is not fully compatible with the kind of strategic emphasis 
described by the issue yield model. Second, Manifesto data introduce an additional difficulty. 
Issue yield configurations (the main predictor) are measured by assessing public opinion on 
specific policy statements, while issue emphasis (the outcome) is measured as the proportion 
of a party manifesto that is devoted to a particular content category. Such categories are 
relatively broad, and with no specific connection to actual survey statements. As a result, a 
stage of conceptual matching, assessing which Manifesto category can be associated with a 
survey statement, is required. Such process yields matchings of variable quality: while some 
statements very closely match a Manifesto category, some often do not. 
c) Time sequence of data collection. Issue yield studies so far have mostly computed the 
main predictor (issue yield) from post-electoral surveys, and the outcome (issue emphasis) from 
pre-electoral manifestos. Such studies have properly acknowledged this paradox, preventing 
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any causal interpretation, and arguing that in fact both measures were capturing the effect of 
latent issue yield configurations; however, a proper design should attempt at measuring the 
predictor and the outcome by collecting data with an appropriate time sequence. 
In light of these concerns, we developed a novel research design. Among others, the main 
distinguishing feature of the design is in the selection of Twitter content to capture the strategic 
communication choices performed by political parties. Among the possible alternatives for 
capturing parties’ strategic issue emphasis choices, social media represent nowadays an 
interesting possibility. In a way, they represent perhaps the most widely accessible form of 
party communication, with party leaders increasingly aware of their power.  
There are good reasons why party communication on Twitter might follow strategic 
considerations, much more than Manifesto data: given the much higher temporal adaptability 
and interaction potential of Twitter content (compared to party manifestos) for shaping the 
actual electoral campaign (Graham, Broersma, Hazelhoff, & Haar, 2013), we expect a party to 
see Twitter as an ideal tool to emphasize the issues presenting the highest electoral potential. 
This is not only due to the potential for direct party-voter interaction on the social media, 
but – perhaps most importantly – to a potential for indirect interaction, deriving from the 
systematic use that journalists (and other politicians) make of the official Twitter accounts of 
political parties and leaders to learn about their political messages, or for directly broadcasting 
politicians’ tweets to a much wider and more traditional audience. As a consequence, Twitter 
is also increasingly attracting the interest of political behaviour scholars (Barberá, 2015; Dubois 
& Gaffney, 2014; Vaccari et al., 2013). Therefore we argue that the content diffused through 
political parties’ Twitter accounts might be effectively used to capture their strategic political 
communication. However, our choice is conditional on a necessary theoretical assumption, 
which we label as the press-release assumption: regardless of how many followers (and of 
which type) a party’s Twitter account might have, and regardless of how unrepresentative and 
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elitist the Twitter audience might be in a given country, we assume that parties will use Twitter 
anyway to communicate their desired messages to the media, just like in a press release; the 
appropriateness of this assumption appears well supported by previous empirical research 
(Parmelee & Bichard, 2011; Verweij, 2012; Parmelee, 2013; Kreiss, 2016). As a result, we 
deem party communication on Twitter a valid indicator of their actual strategic priorities. 
Indeed, this identifies party communication on Twitter as a privileged field to test the 
predictions of issue yield theory: while party manifestos represent an excellent source to 
measure the underlying ideological stances, they may not fully capture short-term strategic 
emphases that characterize contemporary campaigns. Also, while manifestos often contain 
compromise choices related e.g. to different groups within a party, Twitter can be expected to 
effectively capture the genuinely strategic component of party communication (Nooy & 
Kleinnijenhuis, 2013; Shaw, 2006). 
As a result, the newly proposed research design – aimed at addressing the above concerns 
– features three main stages. 
(a) a pre-electoral selection of a large number of potentially relevant issues. This should 
ideally be performed without constraints on the number of issues, and with the purpose 
of covering all issues that might potentially be employed during the coming campaign; 
(b) a voter survey, based on a questionnaire including items for all the previously 
identified issues, aimed at capturing the issue yield configurations for each party before 
the campaign. The collected data should allow to compute the main predictor, the issue 
yield of each positional issue for each party (issue yield calculation only requires a 
positional item for each issue, and a separate item for party preference); 
(c) the collection and coding of Twitter content for each party during the campaign 
(according to a coding scheme covering exactly the same issues identified in step (a)), 
in order to properly capture the strategic campaign choices by political parties. Ideally, 
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tweets should be separately coded by at least two independent coders, in order to assess 
inter-coder reliability of the coding scheme. The coding procedure requires coders to 
assign each tweet either to one of the previously identified issues, or to a residual “other 
issue” category, or to a “non-issue content” category. 
 
A data collection process performed according to the aforementioned stages allows, in our 
view, a more rigorous empirical assessment of the theoretical predictions formulated by the 
issue yield model. 
A pilot study 
We proceeded to implement a pilot study for this research design, at the occasion of the 2014 
EP elections in Italy.9 As a preliminary assessment of the relevance of Twitter communication 
in Italy (at least in terms of the validity of the press-release assumption), we report that the 
number of Italian Twitter users reached 8.9 million in December 2014. All Italian political 
parties and party leaders make a systematic use of Twitter accounts at campaign time, and the 
media comment on political leaders’ tweets on a daily basis. 
The first stage (issue identification) led our team to identify 23 positional statements, 
ranging from economic issues (tax evasion, income inequality, unemployment benefits) to 
social issues (civil partnerships, abortion) to issues specifically related to the European Union 
(EU integration, Euro). Actual question wordings for all issues can be found in Table A1 in the 
Appendix.10 
Second, we fielded the questionnaire through a pre-electoral CAWI (Computer Assisted 
Web Interviewing) survey (N = 1608).11 The data collected allowed us to compute the main 
predictor, the issue yield of each positional issue for each party (8 parties and 23 issues for a 
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total of 184 observations12), at the correct point in time, i.e. based on pre-electoral data. As 
previously stated, such yield is hypothesized to predict Twitter emphasis on the same issues. 
Third, we collected all tweets for the official accounts of the main Italian parties and their 
leaders13 during a campaign window of 21 days.14 Then, all tweets were manually coded by 
two independent coders, required to assign each tweet to one of the aforementioned issues, or 
to classify them as either dedicated to other issues or to non-issue content. As reported in Table 
2, Cohen’s Kappa statistic, measuring inter-rater agreement, gives a value of 0.80.15 After 
checking inter-rater agreement, one of the two coders was preferred for the slightly higher 
number of tweets classified as issue content. Such classification of tweets has allowed the final 
computation of the outcome, i.e. parties’ Twitter emphasis on each issue. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Our pilot implementation of the proposed research design allowed, in our view, to address 
the concerns expressed at the beginning of this section. First, we were free to include a relatively 
large number of issues, in fact covering all the main issues that parties would later employ in 
the campaign. Secondly, the manual coding procedure benefited substantially from the lack of 
a conceptual matching stage: the guide for coders was not represented by general category 
coding guidelines to be then linked to survey statements (such as when using Manifesto data) 
but by the survey statements themselves. Finally, the measurement of issue yield configurations 
in pre-electoral data goes in the direction of addressing the above concern related to the time 
sequence of the data collection. The data collection process we achieved is not a full 
implementation of the research design, as the timeframes of both the predictor and the outcome 
are still in fact coincident; however, this already represents a substantial improvement 
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compared to previous applications, where data for the outcome were collected before data for 
the predictor. 
Modelling choices and statistical issues 
In addition to the general characteristics of the research design, there are few additional 
technical considerations related to the operationalization of specific indicators, as well as the 
choice of an appropriate statistical method for model testing. 
Modelling multiparty competition 
As anticipated in the theoretical section, interparty influences on political communication can 
be described in terms of the relative position of a party – in terms of issue yield – on a given 
issue and of the issue yield differentiation on a given issue. The relative position of political 
parties in terms of issue yield is operationalized by rescaling – within each issue, for all parties 
– the yield to vary between 0 and 1, where 0 is assigned to the minimum observed level of issue 
yield on that specific issue, 1 to the maximum observed value, and all intermediate values 
rescaled accordingly to intermediate values. As a result, the party with the highest yield on an 
issue will score 1, the party with the lowest yield will score 0, and other parties will score 
intermediate values. This effectively captures the relative issue yield position of the party on 
each issue.16 Issue yield differentiation is instead operationalized by looking – for each issue – 
at the range between the maximum and the minimum issue yield values registered for different 
political parties on the same issue. Figure A1 in the Appendix presents the distribution of this 
issue-level indicator.  
Therefore, we model the emphasis assigned by political parties to issues as depending on 
issue yield, our main predictor, as well as by its interaction with the two aforementioned aspects 
of multiparty competition. In particular, we expect both the interaction coefficients between the 
multiparty competition variables and the yield variable to be positive: on the one hand, we 
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expect political parties who are higher in the ranking of issue yields to display a stronger effect 
of issue yields on issue emphasis. In fact, having the greatest yield on a certain issue implies 
that the party is very strongly associated with the issue, and thus the return for emphasizing it 
will be higher than for other parties. 
On the other hand, a greater range between the minimum and maximum issue yield implies 
that the specific issue is less competitive (some parties will clearly avoid the issue), and again 
the parties with the higher yield are more clearly advantaged by its emphasis. When such range 
is smaller, it means that the highest and lowest issue yields are closer to each other, and therefore 
emphasizing that issue might not result in a productive strategy for political parties.17 
Twitter emphasis as censored data 
Are political parties’ tweets resulting from strategic computations that can be predicted by the 
issue yield model or, rather, do they represent erratic expressions detached from the underlying 
dynamics in public opinion? Different answers to this question have important implications for 
correctly modelling our dependent variable, and this requires few additional considerations. 
In the first place, issue emphasis in our study is measured by the proportion of tweets that 
have been assigned to issue categories. This implies that the dependent variable represents a 
proportion: as a result, it is constrained between 0 and 1. Moreover, the distribution of tweets 
is strongly asymmetrical, with a large majority of party-issue combinations (71.2 %) presenting 
no tweets at all  (see Figure A2 in the Appendix).18, In this case, predictions from a linear model 
are likely to fall outside of the zero threshold, producing logically impossible expectations of 
negative emphasis. This will also decrease variance, as values of the dependent variable 
approach 0, leading to an underestimation of the uncertainty in our inferences. For all these 
reasons, OLS regression might not be appropriate. We chose then to treat the proportions as a 
distribution censored in 0. 19 This corresponds to the idea that parties would decrease emphasis 
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even below zero, if that would be possible, for issues that are really unfavourable; while, in 
principle, some issues would receive an actual zero emphasis as they are simply not considered 
very relevant to be mentioned. As a result, the dependent variable might be considered 
(following previous applications) as censored at 0, thus leading to the choice of a Tobit model, 
which we adopt for our analysis. As a result, the estimated Tobit model is the following: 
 
𝐸𝑚𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑗 + 𝜽𝑿 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗           (1) 
Emphij = {
yij
*   if  yij
* > 0
0  if  yij
* ≤ 0
        (2) 
 
where i indexes the political parties and j the policy issues, and the dependent variable 
𝐸𝑚𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑗 is modelled as censored at 0. 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗 indicates the computed index of issue yield for 
party i on policy issue j; 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗 stands for the relative position of the political party in the specific 
issue; and 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑗 refers to the issue differentiation component of multiparty competition. The 
quantities of interest are 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿 and are expected to be greater than 0. All the main terms of the 
interactions have been included in 𝜽𝑿 to facilitate readership; 𝑦𝑖𝑗
∗  is the unobserved uncensored 
variable;  𝜀𝑖𝑗 is a stochastic component clustered within parties. 
 
Descriptive statistics and empirical results  
Before moving to the empirical analysis and hypotheses testing, it is useful to present some 
descriptives related to the positional issues included in the analysis, and to the emphasis parties 
put on them. Table 3 reports, for each party20, the total number of tweets coded as positional 
issues. The table also includes the total number of tweets coded as valence issues (albeit not 
analysed here), the total number of tweets related to non-issue content, and finally the total 
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number of tweets made during the 21 days of electoral campaign under analysis. As can be 
easily noted, the total number of tweets coded as issues (both positional and valence) represents 
only about a third of the total number of tweets made by the official accounts of parties and 
their leaders during the campaign (942 out of 2832). It follows that about two thirds of the 
tweets (1890) were actually dealing with the campaign dynamics, often mentioning other 
political actors rather than more substantive topics.21 The ratio between issue and non-issue 
content is even more unbalanced as concerns the M5S, where as high as 83.6% of the total 
tweets are not related to issues. This finding should not come as a surprise as it is one of the 
earliest findings of political communication research, going back to the work of the Columbia 
School: “The most talked-about subject matter during the campaign was the campaign itself” 
(Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944, p. 115). 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Focusing on positional issues, a first key finding is the large variability in the absolute 
number of tweets produced by each party on positional issues: it ranges from only eight tweets 
produced by the extreme-left party list “Other Europe with Tsipras” (and its leader Nichi 
Vendola) to 192 produced by Forza Italia and its leader Silvio Berlusconi. Notwithstanding the 
emphasis pundits and commentators usually put on the ability of Beppe Grillo and his M5S, as 
well as of Matteo Renzi, on the use of social media for political communication, the campaign 
of the two main Italian parties, PD and M5S, is characterized by a lower number of tweeted 
messages compared to other parties and particularly to those belonging to the centre-right bloc: 
Forza Italia and the Northern League together cover 61% of all positional tweets coded. 
Therefore, Italian parties follow different strategies on Twitter, either selecting a few number 
of tweets (about one for each day of the campaign) that emphasize the position of the party on 
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a given issue or flooding the potential audience with a massive number of tweets (more than 9 
per day as regards Forza Italia), often repeating the same tweet more than once during the same 
day or in following days.22 
But the most important piece of evidence (and a first striking confirmation of the dynamics 
theorized by the issue yield model) emerges from Table 4, which illustrates the frequency 
distribution of tweets across issues and parties. Overall, out of the 184 possible cells (23 issues 
for 8 parties) only 53 were actually filled. This means that, on average, each party focuses on 
only about seven issues during the campaign (from a minimum of 5 for ‘Other Europe with 
Tsipras’ to a maximum of 9 for Forza Italia). Moreover, while some issues are only mentioned 
by a single party, such as sustainable development (owned by the M5S), others are mentioned 
by several parties (like immigration or Renzi’s institutional reforms). We have already noted 
the large variation in the number of tweets made by each party during the campaign. A similar 
variation occurs as far as issues are concerned: out of the 23 issues selected by the research 
team as potentially relevant for the campaign, only 16 have actually received attention by 
parties, while seven have been completely ignored. Moreover, among the 16 issues on which 
parties have put at least some emphasis, we find a large number of issues with a few tweets 
only (11 issues range between 4 and 18 tweets), while six receive larger attention, with more 
than 20 tweets across the 21 days of campaign.  
It is worth examining what are the issues that receive most overall attention, although this 
finding is potentially biased by the disproportionate tendency of some parties to tweet much 
more than others. The most important policy areas on which parties focus are immigration, 
Europe, Renzi’s institutional reforms and economic redistribution. The most tweeted issue is 
immigration (107 tweets), receiving a large emphasis especially from the two opposition parties 
that share the most negative views on immigrants: the Northern League and Brothers of Italy, 
for which this issue accounts, respectively, for 39 % and 32 % of their positional tweets. Not 
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by chance, Northern League and Brothers of Italy are by far the two parties with the highest 
yield on this issue (0.95 and 1 respectively). Considered together, the two issues of EU 
integration and exit from the Euro area are the most salient during the campaign, with 185 
tweets: this finding could be considered surprising, given that one of the assumption of the 
second-order election theory is that the campaign is usually dominated by national issues (Reif 
and Schmitt 1980). However, this is mostly due by the tweet-prolific style of FI and LN. In 
general, parties that have a positive stance towards Europe usually focus on EU integration (the 
overall majority of tweets on this issues come from European Choice that has a very high yield 
on this issue, 0.88), while the issue related to the possible exit from the Euro area is owned by 
the Northern League (80 tweets out of 94) that carried out a heated campaign against the single 
currency. The issue of Renzi’s institutional reform is only partially exploited by Renzi and the 
PD (16 % of their tweets are on this issue) but it becomes the main issue – negatively – 
emphasized by the M5S. On the contrary, Renzi’s party choses to focus on the reduction of 
income inequality (42 % of its tweets are on this issue) given the fiscal bonus of 80 euro 
provided by the government to low-income people just before the start of the electoral 
campaign. Another very important issue is related to the controversy emerged within the center-
right bloc about the supposed “betrayal” of Alfano (the leader of New Center-right, NCD) 
against Berlusconi: not surprisingly, the only parties to mention this issue are the two ones 
involved in the controversy, namely Forza Italia (28 tweets) and NCD (29 tweets). 
Furthermore, note that 72 tweets have been classified as “other issues”, since they deal with 
positional issues falling outside the 23 surveyed ones23.  
 




Exploring the data, we have already pointed out a number of relevant empirical findings, 
and most importantly, we have implicitly assessed at face validity our measure of Twitter 
emphasis. We can finally proceed with the empirical testing of the three hypotheses presented 
in the second section. In particular, we want to test whether the emphasis that parties place on 
the policy issues is predicted by issue yield, and secondly whether the influence of other parties’ 
strategies can be effectively modelled through our two indicators related to multi-party 
competition. 
Testing the hypotheses 
In Table 5, we present estimations of tobit models of Twitter emphasis, according to three 
different empirical specifications. In model (1), we model Twitter emphasis on issue yield; in 
model (2), we add the party’s issue yield relative position on that issue; finally, in model (3) 
we estimate the full theoretical model, including issue yield differentiation on that issue. The 
results are striking. The coefficient for issue yield is positive and statistically significant: as a 
result, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed: issue yield (measured before the campaign) is a predictor of 
Twitter emphasis of specific issues during the campaign, with a remarkable and statistically 
significant effect (and with a pseudo-R2 of 0.09)24. The second model’s specification adds the 
relative component. The presence of a positive and significant interaction between issue yield 
and the 𝑅𝑒𝑙 variable (relative position) confirms Hypothesis 2. The better the party ranking on 
the issue, the stronger the effect of issue yield. Such result (even clearer from the marginal plots 
reported below in Figure 1) in fact shows that issue yield has no effect on tweets’ proportions 
for those issues where the party – compared to other parties – has the lowest level of issue yield. 
The result is reasonable, because when a party has the lowest yield on an issue compared to 
other parties, then emphasizing it (regardless of the low or high value of yield) will be 
counterproductive, ending up favouring a competitor. But for higher values of the 𝑅𝑒𝑙 variable 
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(relative position) the effect of issue yield becomes positive and significant.  Moreover, when 
adding this component of multiparty competition the pseudo-R2 increases up to 0.14. These 
findings are a clear confirmation for Hypothesis 2. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Finally, the main specification includes both components of multiparty competition. Here, 
again, the presence of a positive and significant interaction between issue yield and our 
differentiation index clearly confirms Hypothesis 3: issue yield dynamics are effective for 
issues where parties are clearly differentiated.25. However, it has to be considered that models 
are nonlinear. Therefore, we can only have indications regarding the presence and the sign of 
the relationships, because coefficients represent the marginal effect on the latent uncensored 
dependent variable (𝛽 =
𝜕𝐸[𝑦∗|𝑥]
𝜕𝑥
). Furthermore, it is opportune to estimate the effect of the 
covariates on the censored distribution: 𝛽 ∙ Φ(𝑥𝛽) =
𝜕𝐸[𝑦|𝑥,𝑦>0]
𝜕𝑥
. In this case, the marginal 
effect of issue yield on the number of tweets for a certain issue ranges from -0.12 when issue 
yield is equal to its minimum (𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 = 0.294) and +0.14, for its maximum (𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 = 1). To better 
assess the magnitude of the relations, especially because the three measures are modelled 
interactively, we also provide a graphical representation of the marginal effects in the following 
Figure 1.  
On the left pane, the figure shows that the effect of issue yield on Twitter communication is 
conditional on the parties being enough differentiated on a given issue. Specifically, issue yield 
presents positive and significant effects only for levels of issue differentiation above 0.45 
(approximately). This for example corresponds to an issue where the top party on that issue has 
a yield of 0.90 and the worst party has a yield of 0.45. Thus, parties systematically tend to 
emphasize a topic only insofar as issue opportunities are clearly differentiated among parties 
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on that issue, so that the advantaged parties are rather certain about the potential electoral return. 
Otherwise, parties refrain from emphasizing issues where – regardless of the yield level – other 
parties have similar yields, thus with the risk of being benefited by the party’s emphasis. This 
result provides supporting evidence for Hypothesis 3: issue yield dynamics are relevant on 
issues where parties’ yields are sufficiently differentiated.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
  
The graph on the right pane finally shows how the effect of issue yield on Twitter issue 
emphasis increases for those parties with the highest issue yield ranking on that topic. Our 
interpretation of this finding is that political parties are only sensitive to issue yield for those 
issues where they rank highest (this corresponds to a relative position of 0.8 or higher, in fact 
mostly corresponding to ranking first or second on the issue); otherwise they become indifferent 
to issue yield, as an emphasis could advantage some other party.26 
Finally, the aforementioned effects of issue yield (with the moderating effect of relative 
position and differentiation) are perhaps best exemplified by looking at the predicted 
probabilities that a party will tweet at least once on a specific issue, based on its issue yield 
configuration. When computing such probabilities for different scenarios,27 one understands 
the importance of issue yield. For example, comparing two issues with low (< 0.4) and high (> 
0.9) yield, probability of nonzero party twitting on the issues goes from 18 % to 58 %. For 
issues with average yield (0.55 to 0.85, corresponding to the mean plus or minus one standard 
deviation), a party ranking first will have a twitting probability of 41 %, while a party ranking 
last will have a probability of 14 %. Finally, for issues with high yield (> 0.9), the probability 
is 38 % when party differentiation is low (issue yield for all parties in a range of 0.25 or lower), 
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while it jumps to 78 % when party differentiation is high (issue yields in a range of 0.64 or 
larger). 
Overall, we find that issue yield theory is clearly confirmed by this empirical exercise, and 
with an important explanatory contribution provided by our two innovative measures of multi-
party competition dynamics.  
Conclusions 
The main goal of this paper was the theoretical elaboration of the issue yield model for multi-
party competition contexts, along with the introduction of a novel research design, aimed at 
testing the issue yield model by overcoming some of the limitations of previous studies. In 
particular, the crucial innovation was twofold: the introduction of a framework for multi-party 
competition; and the adoption of Twitter content for measuring the outcome, i.e. the issue 
emphasis employed by different parties on different issues. As for the first aspect, our 
discussion and operationalization of multi-party dynamics, leading to the introduction of the 
concepts of issue yield relative position and issue yield differentiation, appear valid and 
empirically supported. Indeed, the performance of the model significantly improves when 
specifically calibrated by taking into account the complex dynamics of multi-party competition, 
as expressed by our newly introduced measures. 
Secondly, results confirm the validity of the research design, in two regards. First, issue yield 
dynamics are clearly relevant even in Twitter communication: issue yield is a significant 
predictor of Twitter issue emphasis, also providing a non-trivial amount of variance explained. 
Also, the clear asymmetries between parties in the emphasis dedicated to different issues testify 
the clearly strategic dynamics that characterize party communication on Twitter. Additionally, 
a very important finding concerns the very possibility of developing a coding scheme for 
matching Twitter content to positional issue statements. Results are impressively positive: 
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despite the complexity of the scheme, independent coders with no particular previous training 
were able to reach extremely high levels of inter-coder reliability. This yields a very optimistic 
scenario for the replication of this design in new contexts, and suggests the soundness of this 
research design.  
However, we argue that the contribution of this paper is of mostly substantive interest, in 
times of an increasing presence of parties that challenge existing party system structures by 
relying on specific issue packages. Building on the issue yield model (which adopts a dynamic 
and strategic view of the issue agenda, compared to the static view of previous frameworks), 
our contribution not only introduces a realistic model of multi-party dynamics, but also 
develops an empirical research framework which is able – unlike previous applications of the 
issue yield model – to effectively capture even the short-term dynamics of issue competition 
(and perhaps even the presence of opportunities not yet exploited by any party). As a result, we 
argue that the future replication of our design across more elections and countries could provide 
breakthrough insights into the innovative issue competition strategies adopted by both 
mainstream and challenger parties. This in turn could lead to a realistic view of how party 
competition is evolving in these turbulent times. 
 
Notes  
1 In the example reported by Stokes (1963), Eisenhower in 1952 decided to campaign on “Korea, Communism, 
and Corruption” – where he could claim far superior credibility – while avoiding a spatial, Downsian strategy on 
the left-right dimension. Given the overwhelming support of Americans for New Deal policies, this latter would 
have likely resulted in defeat. 
2 Such model would of course only cover the strategic component of the party system agenda, still 
leaving a role for systemic salience (Steenbergen & Scott, 2004; Wagner, 2012).  
3 Recent applications of issue ownership theory have mostly adopted survey-based, more dynamic 
measures of issue ownership, usually through items capturing party competence on a list of shared goals 
(Walgrave, Lefevere, & Tresch, 2012, pp. 781–84). However, these strategies still assume an underlying valence 
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logic which hardly generalizes to positional issues (especially relevant in multi-party systems). This potential 
limitation is somehow also present in innovative approaches such as associative issue ownership (ibidem). 
4 The authors explicitly define issue entrepreneurship as “the … mobilization of a previously ignored 
and not divisive issue [on] … a policy position … substantially different from the status quo position of the 
mainstream” (Hobolt & De Vries, 2015, p. 1163). 
5 Departing from the Downsian model, the issue yield model assumes that parties will mostly attempt not to 
change their policy positions, as this move is often costly and difficult. The model instead posits that a party 
disadvantaged on some issue will downplay its importance and turn to other issues where it enjoys a more favorable 
position. 
6 Party positions are operationalized in dichotomous form (for or against a given policy). 
7 Identified through vote intention. 
8 The index is calculated according to a non-linear expression. Let p be the percentage of respondents 
supporting a party; i the percentage approving a policy statement, f the percentage jointly supporting the party and 













 (De Sio and 
Weber 2014, 876-878). 
9 Our choice of selecting an EP election is not specifically related to EU politics, but relying on the 
approach of considering EP elections as “windows into national political processes” (Van der Eijk & Franklin, 
1996; Brug, Eijk, & Franklin, 2007; De Sio & Franklin, 2012). Based on the consensus over EP elections as 
“second-order” elections, we deem that this selection does not introduce significant biases in terms of testing our 
multi-party model, as EP campaigns tend to be dominated by domestic issues (as was the case for Italy in 2014: 
see De Sio, Emanuele, & Maggini, 2014). 
10 The questionnaire also included credibility items for 17 valence issues, not analysed here, but included in 
the Twitter coding scheme. 
11 CAWI fieldwork took place between April 29 and May 9, 2016, on a sample of the adult population resident 
in Italy (response rate was 25.9%). Respondents were extracted – according to a quota sampling by sex, age and 
geographical area – from a Web respondent community. Results reported here (except for the final models) were 
then weighted by stratification variables, plus level of education, political interest and past party vote recall. As 
suggested by Pasek (2016), an online survey relying on a non-probability sample may provide imperfect estimates 
of the frequencies of politically relevant variables. This is confirmed by e.g. frequency distributions for political 
interest in our sample with a well-known and widely-used probability sample, the 2013 CAPI survey from the 
ITANES (Italian National Election Studies). The two distributions show significant differences, with very 
interested and fairly interested representing 75% of respondents in our survey vs. 37% according to ITANES, and 
a reported turnout of 85.5% vs. the actual 58.7%. However, such large differences in political interest do not 
translate in equally large differences in the main quantities of interest. When comparing unweighted with weighted 
data (with our weight also including political interest), support for specific policies (both at large and within each 
party) only differs by few percentage points, so that a final robustness check we performed (replicating our final 
models on both weighted and unweighted data) yields fully equivalent results (available on request). 
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12 The total number of observations for issue yield is 368, since each issue has two sides (pro or anti). The final 
number of observations is 184 (368/2) because we assume the optimal side is chosen (the one with the highest 
yield). 
13 We coded tweets from official accounts of the following parties and leaders: Democratic Party (PD), Five 
Star Movement (M5S), Forza Italia (FI), Northern League (LN), New Center-right (NCD), Other Europe with 
Tsipras (TSIPRAS) and European Choice (SE); and from official accounts of the following leaders: Matteo Renzi 
(PD), Beppe Grillo (M5S), Silvio Berlusconi (FI), Giorgia Meloni (Brothers of Italy, FDI), Angelino Alfano 
(NCD), Nichi Vendola (TSIPRAS) and Andrea Romano (SE). A party account did not exist for FDI, while a leader 
account did not exist for Matteo Salvini (LN). In both cases, we coded party communication from the other 
available account (Giorgia Meloni and Northern League). 
14 Twitter content was collected between April 14 and May 4, covering between 6 and 3 weeks before the 
vote. 
15 Fleiss (1981)’s guidelines to interpret the meaning of the kappa statistic consider values over 0.75 as 
excellent. Kappa values were calculated on a 40-issue coding scheme that included both the 23 positional issues 
and the 17 valence issues (not analyzed here). 
16 Such rescaling to 0-1 eliminates between-issue differences in issue yield differentiation, which are separately 
captured by the previous index. As a result, we can separately assess these two distinct conceptual aspects. 
17 While developing our multi-party extension of the issue yield model, we also explored alternative 
explanations, with special regard to the relevance of systemic salience (Steenbergen & Scott, 2004; Kaplan, Park, 
& Ridout, 2006; Wagner, 2012) and of a more classic operationalization of issue ownership. Results of these 
explorations, which confirm the validity of our model, are reported in the Appendix, and briefly mentioned 
below in terms of robustness checks.  
18 This is not surprising, and indeed a confirmation that parties tend to concentrate their emphasis on a relatively 
small number of issues among all the potential issues available. 
19 Another possibility is to fit a linear model on the logit transformation of the dependent variable (Papke & 
Wooldridge, 1996). However, this would exclude 0s and 1s, which would require a separate treatment. This 
problem appears relevant, as 0s are the mode of the distribution. For the same reason, tweets’ proportions cannot 
be modeled through a beta distribution.  
20 Each row represents the sum of the official account of the party and that of the respective party leader. 
21 In any case, coders were clearly instructed to code as issue-related all tweets that presented issue 
content, regardless of the presence of references to other actors. 
22 In a way, the relatively sparse communication style of some parties is a confirmation of the press 
release assumption: under strong media attention, even a single daily tweet will have a very large media impact.  
23 Indeed, note that all the 72 tweets classified as “other issues” were about the classic taxes/public 
services trade-off, which – in this particular framing – we did not include in our classification scheme. However, 
this represents a confirmation of the overall validity of our ex-ante issue selection, given that only one relevant 
issue was not included in the scheme. 
24 We performed additional robustness checks. In particular, we controlled for systemic issue salience 
by relying on a convenience operationalization first used by Bartels (1986), based on the number of missing 
responses on issue stances (capturing the inverse of issue salience). The results (Table A2 in the Appendix) are 
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reassuring, showing a positive and significant effect of systemic issue salience but still leaving the results of our 
model fundamentally unchanged. We also controlled for the effect of issue ownership by introducing a 
dichotomous variable where issues that are unambiguously owned by a given party are coded 1, and all the 
remaining issues are coded 0 (party-issue pairings available on request). The effect of issue yield remains 
significant even when we control for issue ownership (Table A3 in the Appendix). Moreover, we performed a 
leave-one-out test by re-running the analyses reported in Table 5 excluding one party at a time and one issue at a 
time (for our 23 positional issues and 8 parties). The results are substantially identical to those reported in Table 
5 (results available upon request). 
25 The results appear clearly robust, as they hold even if we model the issue emphasis with simple OLS 
regression, or even with a mixture of a beta distribution (modeling the internal values) and a Bernoulli distribution 
(to inflate the 0s). This latter specification would correspond to a more articulated decision process (Ospina & 
Ferrari, 2012), separating which issues to emphasize from how much to emphasize them.  
26 The presence of apparently negative effects of issue yield for extremely low values of Rel emerges 
from issues of parametric extrapolation of the simplified multiplicative interaction (such effects mostly disappear 
when modelling the interaction through dummies for different levels of Rel), combined with distributional 
considerations arising from the correlation between the two variables that are interacted (yield and Rel). In 
particular, combinations of very high yield with very low values of Rel would only materialize in presence of 
almost unanimous issues, where issue yield values would lose most of their meaning. 
27 We computed the probabilities that tweets’ proportions for each party-issue pair are larger than zero, 
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Table 1. Risks and opportunities for party competition related to several policy issues, according to the issue yield model (PD, M5S, FI and LN 





within the party 
  Issue yield 
  PD   M5S   FI   LN 
PD M5S FI LN   Pro Anti   Pro Anti   Pro Anti   Pro Anti 
Reduce spending for F-35 fighters 88 92 94 70 83   0.88 -0.48   0.93 -0.13   0.68 0.24   0.82 0.14 
Change towards a sustainable model of development 87 93 94 81 79   0.89 -0.49   0.93 -0.13   0.79 0.13   0.79 0.18 
Reduce income inequality 84 91 91 76 74   0.85 -0.45   0.89 -0.09   0.74 0.19   0.73 0.23 
Tougher attitude with India on the Enrica Lexie case 80 81 78 90 98   0.69 -0.29   0.73 0.07   0.90 0.03   0.98 -0.02 
More restrictive immigration laws 78 57 79 90 95   0.32 0.08   0.75 0.06   0.89 0.04   0.95 0.02 
Reduce taxes before fighting tax evasion 75 56 78 88 78   0.29 0.11   0.74 0.06   0.87 0.05   0.77 0.20 
Italian citizenship should be given to children born in Italy 74 89 72 57 36   0.82 -0.42   0.67 0.14   0.54 0.38   0.34 0.62 
Foreign companies selling services via the Internet should be taxed 
here 74 84 70 67 74   0.75 -0.35   0.64 0.16   0.64 0.28   0.73 0.23 
EU integration is a good thing 71 91 70 60 41   0.85 -0.45   0.64 0.16   0.57 0.35   0.39 0.57 
Welfare chauvinism 70 44 71 77 93   0.10 0.30   0.65 0.15   0.76 0.17   0.93 0.03 
Heterologous insemination should be allowed 68 77 77 72 59   0.63 -0.23   0.73 0.07   0.70 0.22   0.57 0.39 
Prostitution should be legalized 64 67 79 76 83   0.46 -0.06   0.75 0.06   0.74 0.19   0.82 0.14 
A universal unemployment check should be introduced 59 62 74 60 43   0.39 0.01   0.68 0.12   0.57 0.35   0.41 0.55 
Introduce civil partnerships, even for gay couples 58 73 66 45 38   0.57 -0.17   0.59 0.21   0.41 0.51   0.36 0.61 
Reduce the power of the judiciary 49 27 40 72 81   -0.18 0.58   0.28 0.52   0.70 0.22   0.80 0.16 
Companies should have more freedom to hire and fire  44 36 37 65 69   -0.03 0.43   0.25 0.55   0.63 0.30   0.68 0.28 
Founding NCD, Alfano betrayed Berlusconi 40 22 40 77 66   -0.24 0.64   0.28 0.52   0.76 0.17   0.64 0.32 
To fight tax evasion, cash transaction limits should be lowered 35 59 40 29 24   0.35 0.05   0.28 0.53   0.23 0.69   0.21 0.75 
Soft drugs should be legalized 31 43 53 23 24   0.09 0.31   0.44 0.37   0.18 0.75   0.21 0.75 
Renzi's institutional reforms reduce democratic participation 31 15 37 44 43   -0.36 0.76   0.24 0.56   0.40 0.52   0.41 0.55 
Italy should leave the Euro 29 6 40 40 76   -0.50 0.90   0.28 0.53   0.35 0.57   0.75 0.21 
Italy should be split into macro-regions, with right to secession 26 10 24 47 69   -0.44 0.84   0.09 0.72   0.43 0.49   0.68 0.28 























































Party N %  N %  N %  N % 
Pd 19 16.8  24 21.2  70 61.9  113 100 
M5S 32 7.8  35 8.6  341 83.6  408 100 
Fi 192 14.7  202 15.5  913 69.9  1307 100 
Ln 160 33.1  27 5.6  296 61.3  483 100 
Se 79 48.5  21 12.9  63 38.7  163 100 
FdI 25 28.1  4 4.5  60 67.4  89 100 
Ncd 59 29.2  44 21.8  99 49.0  202 100 
Tsipras 8 11.9  11 16.4  48 71.6  67 100 

























Table 4. Frequency distribution of tweets across positional issues, by party. 
Policy 
Party N 
Pd M5s Fi Ln Ncd FdI Tsipras Se   
Change towards a sustainable model of development   8             8 
Reduce spending for F-35   5         2   7 
Reduce income inequality 8 2 6   4 1     21 
Tougher attitude against India on the Enrica Lexie case 1     2   2     5 
Foreign companies selling services via internet should be taxed                 0 
Italian citizenship should be given to children born in Italy                 0 
EU integration is a good thing 1   31 2 1   2 54 91 
Heterologous fecondation should be allowed                 0 
Prostitution should be legalized                 0 
Immigration laws should be more restrictive     22 63 12 8 1 1 107 
Before fighting tax evasion, taxes should be reduced 1   12           13 
Civil partnerships                 0 
A universal unemployment check should be introduced   4             4 
Welfare chauvinism       4   4     8 
To fight tax evasion, cash limit should be lowered                 0 
Soft drugs should be legalized       2   3   3 8 
Reduce the power of the judiciary 1   5 2         8 
Companies should have more freedom to hire and fire    1 5   5   2 5 18 
Founding NCD, Alfano betrayed Berlusconi     28   29       57 
Renzi's institutional reforms reduce democratic participation 3 12 24 3 2 3   2 49 
Pro life           4     4 
Italy should leave the Euro     2 80     1 11 94 
Italy should be split into macro-regions                 0 
Other issues 4   57 2 6     3 72 
                    



















Table 5. Regression analysis of Twitter emphasis. 
 Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Yield 0.55*** -0.34 -1.80** 
 (4.63) (-1.18) (-3.14) 
    
Rel - -0.57 -0.65* 
  (-1.81) (-2.42) 
Yield × Rel - 1.05* 1.26** 
  (2.34) (2.69) 
Diff - - -2.33* 
   (-2.59) 
Yield × Diff - - 2.90** 
   (2.88) 
Constant -0.54*** -0.04 1.06* 
 (-5.31) (-0.27) (2.24) 
    
Observations 184 184 184 
Pseudo-R2 .09 .14 .19 
Note: table entries represent coefficients for the Tobit regression of issue emphasis on 
the hypothesized predictors (estimation based on robust standard errors, with 
observations clustered by party). The dependent variable is censored at 0. T-statistics 























Note: the two charts represent graphically the Tobit model (3) reported Table 5. The left pane represents the 
conditional effect of issue yield on Twitter emphasis for varying values of issue differentiation. The right pane 
represents the same effects for varying values of the relative position of the parties with respect to the issues. Only 
the values for the subpopulation of issues with at least one tweet 𝐸(𝐸𝑚𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑗|𝐸𝑚𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑗 > 0)  are reported.  Vertical 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 1. Multiparty dynamics: marginal effect of issue yield on issue emphasis 
 
